MIDEAST MIRROR 30.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

1-Yesterday’s enemies, today’s allies

2-Talking of Turkish intervention

1-Yesterday’s enemies, today’s allies

 It is not unlikely that yesterday's enemies could become today's allies, fighting in the same trench against a new tsunami that threatens to sweep all the regimes that lie in its path. Its name is the 'Islamic State' that the sixty-strong U.S.-led coalition, its warplanes and air raids over a year, have failed to weaken or halt in its tracks, let alone destroy. The mission facing the 'new quartet,' assuming it comes into being, will not be easy; it is extremely difficult, in fact. It may require the deployment of ground forces in addition to air raids. The question is this: will Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia deploy their forces to fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army, which all three countries have been fighting against so far? And what about the armed Syrian opposition fractions that have been fighting to topple the regime for the last four years?--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

There is therefore a point in the middle of the road towards a solution, and it has to do with Assad's fate. It seems that his presence during a transitional phase may be part of the solution and the main part of the ‘deal’. But his prospects of ‘remaining in power forever’ – to quote the famous regime slogan raised in Damascus – have become a thing of the past. So far, however, we still do not know exactly how Iran will act on this issue after it signs its nuclear deal. Will it meet the international powers halfway, or will it prefer the option of confrontation? Iran itself does not speak a simple language in this regard; and the future of the Syrian crisis may depend on the balance of power between Iran's hard-liners and reformists--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu’allem’s latest visit to Moscow and the statements made by Russian leaders, suggest that Moscow is mediating in the formation of a four-way anti-terrorism alliance that will include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan, in addition to Syria, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. This alliance is now possible because of ISIS’s advances and the predicament that each of its prospective members is now facing. The Syrian crisis seems to be at a crossroad, with the genuine prospect of some kind of accord between the regime and its allies on the one hand, and the opposition and its allies, on the other, argues a leading Jordanian commentator. While the main contours of a political settlement may have emerged, much depends on Iran's behavior after its nuclear deal with the '5 + 1.'

UNEXPECTED VISIT: "Mr. Walid al-Mu'allem, the 'doyen' of Syrian diplomacy, never visits Moscow unless there is some major political or diplomatic project underway, or in order to pave the way for strategic decisions, as in the case of Syria's decision to hand over its chemical weapons, to cite but one example," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Tuesday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This, in turn, leads us to inquire into the reasons for his unexpected visit to Moscow, where he met directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

The issue this time round has nothing to do with chemical weapons or finding a political solution for the Syrian crisis but with something much more serious. It has to do with the Russian leadership's informing Mr. Mu'allem of an imminent change in the existing political and military equations, not only as regards the Syrian file, but the entire map of regional alliances. This is thanks to ISIS, whose 'expansion' and bloody attacks that are threatening the entire region's stability, have now become a nightmare that is driving the region's governments to rethink their priorities.

The most important point to emerge from Mr. Mu'allem's meeting with the Russian leadership consists of what President Putin said regarding a new Russian plan that is meant to bring Riyadh and Damascus together in a broad alliance against ISIS, and that may include Turkey and Jordan as well. As reported by the Russian News Agency, the Russian president said that Moscow's contacts with the countries in the region, including Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, 'demonstrate that everyone wants to contribute to fight this evil,' he said, referring to ISIS militants.

The Russian president would not have resorted to this proposal – the establishment of a four-way Syrian/Saudi/Turkish/Jordanian coalition to confront ISIS – and would not have invited Mr. Mu'allem to Moscow to discuss it unless he had received official and serious requests from the three states concerned to convince Syria to join this new alliance.

In other words, it is possible to claim that the three states, that have begun to sense the threat posed by ISIS, have come to accept President Putin's view that war on this 'State' cannot succeed without the Syrian regime's active participation.

About a week ago, the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Yevgeny Lukyanov, took everyone by surprise with a statement urging the Arab Gulf states to pray that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would remain in power, since he alone can stop ISIS and halt its advances. He said: 'If Assad's regime collapses, Riyadh and the other Gulf capitals will be the next targets for the Islamic State. This is because there are some 5000 Saudi subjects fighting in its ranks and they will return to their country after the confrontations end. And all they know how to do when they do return, is to kill.'

Nothing happens by coincidence in Moscow. Such momentous statements from the second highest ranking official in the Russian national security leadership were intended to pave the way for the new Russian map of alliances. This brings together under a single umbrella those currently fighting it out in Syria, setting their disagreements and wars aside, and choosing cooperation so as to confront the major danger that threatens them all – ISIS.

The bombings in Kuwait, Tunisia, and Lyon, for which ISIS has claimed responsibility, appear to have confirmed the senior Russian official's prediction, especially since most expectations are that other bombings are on their way, with Bahrain as the most likely next venue.

The Kuwait bombing that led to the death of 27 worshippers in a Shiite mosque was meant as a strong message to all the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states. This message said that the fire has begun to strike at your heartlands. The attack in which a young man stormed hotels hosting foreign tourists in the Tunisian city of Sousse and opened fire killing 38 and wounding 200 of them, sends an even more serious message. It is directed at Turkey and its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in particular. It says that ‘we (ISIS) can repeat the same scenario and destroy the Turkish tourist season that brings more than thirty billion dollars into the Turkish coffers every year’.

The latest advances in northern Syria by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) that is close to the Turkish opposition Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and President Erdogan's threat to intervene militarily to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state, confront the Turkish president with a difficult choice, now that Turkish national security itself is under threat. His first choice is to ally with ISIS, and the other choice is to ally with the Syrian regime. He is most likely to lean towards the second option. And it is not unlikely that he may have asked for Moscow's help in facilitating a move towards this second option in light of its good relations with Damascus.

Saudi Arabia is also facing a similar situation. It senses that its national security is under threat from the same source. A number of reliable sources have reported that during Saudi Deputy Crown-Prince and Defense Minister Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s recent visit [to Moscow], he told the Russian leadership of his country's desire to back away from its Syrian policies, and to open channels of communication with the Syrian regime. We believe it is thus not unlikely that Prince Salman and the messages he carried to President Putin from his father the king are the main motive behind Moscow's talk of a possible new four-way alliance.

Politics is not based on principles, but on interests. It is not unlikely that yesterday's enemies could become today's allies, fighting in the same trench against a new tsunami that threatens to sweep all the regimes that lie in its path. Its name is the 'Islamic State' that the sixty-strong U.S.-led coalition, its warplanes and air raids over a year, have failed to weaken or halt, let alone destroy.

The mission facing the 'new quartet,' assuming it comes into being, will not be easy; it is extremely difficult, in fact. It may require the deployment of ground forces in addition to air raids. The question is this: will Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia deploy their forces to fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army, which all three countries have been fighting against so far? And what about the armed Syrian opposition fractions that have been fighting to topple the regime for the last four years?

The lesson is over, and may God have mercy on the souls of the 300,000 Syrian martyrs who have fallen in one big swindle, as well as the four million displaced and the destruction of more than half the country in a bloody 'game of nations.'

"The Arab region has become the arena for bloody experimentation, and the Arab people have become its lab mice. We say this with a lump in our throats," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

FORK IN THE ROAD: "The Syrian crisis is gradually approaching a decisive 'strategic' fork in the road," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

The options seem to vary widely, from de facto partition into principalities based on sect, confession, and ethnicities, perhaps as a prelude to final determination of borders, to the scenario of a 'political settlement' that will place the war raging in and over Syria on another track, but one that we do not claim will represent a final resolution of all these wars.

But the bad news from Syria is that not even the most optimistic of these scenarios will end the killing, destruction, and desolation in the immediate or foreseeable future. For Syria's road to security and stability is still long, thorny, and bloody.

Syria's geography is scattered over numerous maps and fronts, with each 'part' controlled by different forces. 'Useful Syria' is under the control of the regime and its allies. It basically consists of Damascus, Homs, and Hama up to the coastline, with sites that are still important in Aleppo, the southern provinces and parts of al-Hasaka. This area constitutes around one-third of Syria's territory and is where more than half the population resides.

Half of Syria's total area is controlled by ISIS, with the remainder controlled either by the YPG, or the Nusra Front, or by the remnants of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with its various and conflicting factions and alliances, and their various and conflicting operations rooms.

Militarily, and after a series of breakthroughs achieved by the Syrian army and its allies late last year and early this year, the picture seems to be in the process of being reversed. The army has lost Tadmur [Palmyra] and northwestern Syria [Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour], and is in a difficult situation in the three southern provinces (as-Suweida', Der'a, and al-Qunaitra) and in parts of the Damascus Countryside Province. Moreover, the advances by the army and Hizbollah do not mean that the battle for Qalamoun and Anti-Lebanon mountain range has ended.

Furthermore, 'useful Syria' is itself still 'booby trapped' with many pockets and areas outside the regime's control and writ. Perhaps the most dangerous are those that lie between Jobar and Duma, not to mention al-Yarmouk and al-Hajar al-Aswad at Damascus's gateways.

Militarily as well, and as far as the balance of power is concerned, four main forces now control the largest parts of the zone of military operations: The army and the militias allied to it; ISIS in the northeast, which is expanding; the Nusra Front and the Islamist and jihadi factions allied with and are not that different from it –within the framework of Jayshul Fateh which is backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar; and, finally, the Kurdish YPG which has displayed such ferocity in fighting from 'Ain al-Arab to Tal Abyad. As for the FSA, its influence is not worth mentioning, except on the 'southern front' where the conditions are still shifting and have not stabilized in any definite shape or form.

The map of competing forces, areas, and 'emirates' is causing fear among many regional parties, specifically, the neighboring countries. Turkey does not want a 'Kurdish state' in northern Syria. [President] Erdogan has been threatening to take all necessary measures to prevent such a state from coming into being, while Ankara's press has been speaking of plans to carve out a buffer zone that may be 30-to-50 kilometers deep into Syrian territories and may stretch to no less than 110 kilometers along the borders.

Jordan wants neither ISIS nor the Nusra Front to take up position along its northern borders. This is why it has been speaking of 'backing and arming the [Sunni] clans' and why it has unofficially adopted the 'southern front.' Reports speak of [Jordanian] military reinforcements along the northern borders, while scenarios regarding the creation of a buffer zone in the south are in the air in tandem with the reports of a northern 'buffer zone.'

In response to this situation, certain regional and international parties are expressing their concern and wariness as regards the coming challenges and threats. Russia continues to speak of its support for the regime and its president. This was most recently confirmed in the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Walid al-Mu'allem.

For its part, Iran has been speaking of a qualitative strategic step that will bring a new anti-terrorism coalition to the forefront – namely, an Iranian/Iraqi/Syrian coalition, together with the 'sub-state' forces that are affiliated to this coalition: Hizbollah, the Iraqi [Shiite] militias, and the Houthis. This coalition is most likely to emerge after the Iranian nuclear agreement has been signed and not before. Meanwhile, [Iranian Revolutionary Guards Commander] Qassem Soleimani has spoken of an army of 150-thousand fighters that will be deployed across this entire axis under the banner of fighting ISIS and terrorism.

There have been ceaseless reports that the Russian and U.S. positions have drawn close to each other. Some reports claim that there is a U.S./Western acceptance – opposed by the regional (Saudi/Turkish/Qatari) triangle – of Assad remaining in power for a transitional phase, with a government that has broad powers and in which the regime and the opposition are brought together. Other reports speak of Russia’s readiness to discuss Assad's future 'after the transitional phase.' Both approaches are grounded in a recognition of the need to preserve the state and its institutions so as to ensure that Syria as a whole does not fall into the clutch of extremism and terrorism.

The Syrian political opposition tailored its Cairo program to suit the points of agreement between Moscow and Washington. It issued its view of a solution; one that accepts dialogue and negotiation with the regime, and does not require Assad's removal from power or him stepping down as a precondition for initiating a dialogue and negotiations, but as the potential final outcome of the transitional path.

As for the Istanbul-based opposition, it is in the process of holding new elections with a new round of Saudi/Turkish/Qatari competition to dominate the opposition Syrian National Coalition (SNC). Today, Turkey holds this coalition’s reins via its president who is close to (and allegedly a member of) the ruling Turkish AKP (Justice and Development Party). But whatever the outcome of these elections, there is no cause for optimism that a fundamental change is in the offing in the SNC's position. The SNC has completely tied itself to the shifts within this Gulf/Turkish coalition and its balances.

There is therefore a point in the middle of the road towards a solution, and it has to do with Assad's fate. It seems that his presence during a transitional phase may be part of the solution and the main part of the deal. But his prospects of ‘remaining in power forever’ – to quote the famous regime slogan raised in Damascus – have become a thing of the past.

So far, however, we still do not know exactly how Iran will act on this issue after it signs its nuclear deal. Will it meet the international powers halfway, or will it prefer the option of confrontation? Iran itself does not speak a simple language in this regard; and the future of the Syrian crisis may depend on the balance of power between Iran's hard-liners and reformists.

"And this represents an additional opportunity in a region whose contemporary history seems to be that of its offensive paradoxes," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

2-Talking of Turkish intervention

The West has no better option than Turkey. It realizes that it can deploy its forces to Syria, and it can see how the terrorist organizations have grown and how they have come to pose a threat to the world at large. At the same time, it has become clear that the Syrian regime has become so weak that it is impossible for it to continue to fight, while the militias that follow Iran have failed in their mission, despite their enormous numbers. Turkish intervention does not mean that the Turks would go far and reach the Syrian capital or any of the major cities. The talk is of a zone that is fifty kms deep, according to the Turkish press. That would secure the safety of the borders, push back ISIS's fighters, and prepare the political climate for a new round of negotiations to decide the fate of the regime in Syria--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

Any [Turkish] intervention will clash with the Kurds and with the Syrian state and army. It will drive the YPG and the Syrian army towards greater common action, which may have a negative impact on the West's strategy that is based on cooperation with the YPG against ISIS, as an alternative to cooperating with the Syrian army and state…the results of the recent Turkish elections and the political and popular balance that they reflect have strengthened the hand of the Turkish army’s commanders vis-à-vis the attempt to implicate the country’s armed forces in any risky and uncalculated adventures…any clash with the Kurds and the Syrian army bears the severe risk of developing and extending inside Turkish territory…All these factors together not only render any decision in favor of a direct military intervention unlikely, but a form of suicide that Erdogan and his crowd will not be allowed to implicate Turkey in--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

Talk of a Turkish military intervention in northern Syria now seems more credible than ever before in light of the growing threats posed both by Kurdish separatism and ISIS terrorism, maintains a veteran Saudi commentator. Most regional and international players, moreover, would welcome such an intervention. It would then set the scene for a political settlement of the crisis. There are many reasons why it is extremely unlikely that Turkey would resort to direct military intervention in the Syrian crisis, maintains a commentator in a pro-Damascus Beirut daily. Such intervention will need international and regional cover, which is not forthcoming; will undermine the West's strategy for fighting ISIS; will run counter to the popular mood in Turkey as revealed by the recent elections; and would threaten to bring the war into Turkish territories.

WHAT ANKARA IS THINKING: "There has been repeated talk of Turks' plans to enter northern Syria ever since the Syrian revolution began four years ago," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Tuesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

But events have shown that all that has been said about this issue did not correspond with what Ankara was thinking, contrary to the hopes of Syrians, who have sought the Turks' help against the violence of the Assad regime and the regional powers competing with Ankara and are wary of its ambitions.

This time round, the talk issued from Turkey itself and it was frank. Ankara has threatened that it will not permit the establishment of a Kurdish zone along its borders inside Syria. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that Turkey will not remain silent in response to the demographic changes in Syria. PM Ahmet Davutoglu has threatened that his country will protect its borders. And all this din emerged after a meeting of senior civilian and military state leaders that discussed the developments resulting from fighting between the groups across the Turkish borders, as a result of which Turkey now has two neighbors, both of which are expanding on the ground and gaining in strength – ISIS, and the Syrian Kurdish militias.

Turkey's entry into Syrian territories now seems acceptable to many powers, including NATO, of which Turkey is a member. This time round, the Turks have sufficient incentives to drive them to carry out the invasion that has been expected for years. The main reasons for the Turks' hesitation in this regard are domestic and foreign. Syria is changing and taking new demographic and geographical forms. Meanwhile, Turkey has stood on the sidelines, watching, even though it is the main loser from what is happening in its southern neighbor where forces hostile to it have emerged –Kurdish, such as the PKK, and Islamist, such as ISIS. This is in addition to the displacement of more Syrian refugees into Turkey in huge numbers that threaten the country’s security, resources, and its demographic makeup, of course.

Who wants Turkey to intervene?

Almost all shades of the Syrian opposition spectrum hope for such an intervention except for ISIS. The opposition views Syria's northern neighbor as the sole power that can change the balance of power in the opposition's favor. It now also appears that the U.S. does not object to a Turkish intervention that is directed at ISIS. The project may develop into the establishment of a buffer zone on the Syrian side of the border where the refugees can relocate.

As for those opposed to Turkish intervention, they include the Syrian regime and its Iranian ally. This is despite the fact that Iran has over thirty-thousand fighters on Syrian territory that are fighting under the banner of Lebanese, Iraq, Iranian, and Afghani extremist Shiite militias. Iraq also is opposed to any Turkish intervention.
It is worth noting, however, that this time round, Iran sent an unprecedented positive hint with a statement from one official a few days ago who said that Turkey has the right to enter Syria so as to prevent the establishment of the Kurdish corridor. For the Iranians, like the Turks, are wary of the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity that would threaten the unity of all three countries – Iran, Turkey, and Iraq.

The Kurdish Syrians have grown in strength. They now control wide areas of the borders with Turkey, especially after their victory at Tal Abyad, which took the Turks by surprise. The second threat comes from ISIS, which may succeed in recapturing Kobani, another border town neighboring Turkey. And between the Kurds and ISIS, the threats to Ankara have doubled, especially because many Western governments have warned their citizens against traveling to the country in anticipation of attacks by the terrorist organization. Such a warning was issued one day before ISIS's attack on the Tunisian summer resort in which twenty-seven people were killed. Anyone following the social media would find it brimming with threats by ISIS supporters against the Turkish government, with violent attacks on Erdogan in person.

If the Turks were to make up their minds and enter northern Syria, this is most likely to be supported by most Arab states and a number of Islamic states, and perhaps also by the U.S. if Turkey agrees to involving the anti-terrorism coalition which would then support it by controlling the aims of its military campaign. For the West has no better option than Turkey. It realizes that it can deploy its forces to Syria, and it can see how the terrorist organizations have grown and how they have come to pose a threat to the world at large. At the same time, it has become clear that the Syrian regime has become so weak that it is impossible for it to continue to fight, while the militias that follow Iran have failed in their mission, despite their enormous numbers. Turkish intervention does not mean that the Turks would go far and reach the Syrian capital or any of the major cities. The talk is of a zone that is fifty kms deep, according to the Turkish press.

"That would secure the safety of the borders, push back ISIS's fighters, and prepare the political climate for a new round of negotiations to decide the fate of the regime in Syria," concludes Rashed.

End…

RENEWED DEBATE: "The Turkish media has leaked reports that a debate has been underway in the military and political decision-making circles so as to decide whether or not Turkey should resort to direct military intervention in Syria," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in the pro-Damascus Beirut daily al-Bina'.

This debate has been renewed in light of the advances made by YPG units along most of the border strip between Syria and Turkey from al-Qamishli in Hasaka Province to 'Ain al-Arab in Aleppo Province. In fact, most of the Syrian/Turkish borders now are under the control of these units that are, in effect, the military and political arm of the PKK in Turkey.

These latest advances have produced results that Erdogan hopes to exploit in order to secure permission, or at least to renew his demand, for direct Turkish military intervention in Syria. That has been his unchanging dream ever since the beginning of the Syrian crisis till today.

The first of these results is that they hinder Turkey's ability to intervene in wide areas of the Aleppo, al-Raqqa, and al-Hasaka provinces. Ankara has played a major role via al-Qa'ida and ISIS as well as other armed factions in all three provinces. All these factions act in cooperation and coordination with the Turkish government, which has consolidated Turkey's influence in northern Syria. And it is via this growing influence, that Ankara's influence in the overall Syrian situation has grown as well.

The second result is that the force now deployed along the longest stretch of the Turkish/Syrian borders is the ruling AKP's enemy number-one. There are many reasons for this, some political, some ideological, some having to do with the Turkish situation in general, and some having to do with Turkey's influence in Syria and Iraq.

But can Turkey take a decision to intervene militarily in Syria? And can the outcome of the latest reported consultations be a decision that directs the Turkish army to deploy its ground and air forces into the Syrian territories?

This is very unlikely, almost impossible in fact, in light of the following factors:

- First, crossing the Syrian borders requires international and regional cover. It is clear that this was not available in the past, and is not available today. The Turkish government will be unable to take a decision that would represent a serious problem in the absence of such cover. In fact, this may best explain the failure of Erdogan's former attempts throughout the Syrian crisis.

- Second, any intervention will clash with the Kurds and with the Syrian state and army. It will drive the YPG and the Syrian army towards greater common action, which may have a negative impact on the West's strategy that is based on cooperation with the YPG against ISIS, as an alternative to cooperating with the Syrian army and state.

- Third, the results of the recent Turkish elections and the political and popular balance that they reflect have strengthened the hand of the Turkish army’s commanders vis-à-vis the attempt to implicate the country’s armed forces in any risky and uncalculated adventures. This means that the situation today is more difficult than before as far as any decision that Erdogan may hope to obtain.

- Fourth, any clash with the Kurds and the Syrian army bears the severe risk of developing and extending inside Turkish territory. This is because the border area where the YPG is deployed runs parallel to those areas inhabited by a Kurdish majority inside Turkey.

"All these factors together not only render any decision in favor of a direct military intervention unlikely, but a form of suicide that Erdogan and his crowd will not be allowed to implicate Turkey in," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

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