11.5.15 Arab World

MIDEAST MIRROR 11.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

1- The U.S. steps in

2-Iran’s two bombs

1- The U.S. steps in

Because the U.S. is committed to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states’ security and because it has vast interests in this region, it does not want this [Yemen] war to continue for any longer. The fear is that it may spin out of control, and confront the U.S. with difficult choices including the prospect of direct participation in the war, rather than merely supporting it, providing it with logistical backing and selling more weapons to the countries taking part in it. This is why the truce was timed to coincide with the Camp David [Gulf] summit; in fact, the repeated extension of this truce represents the best way out of this dilemma--Hamidi al-‘Abdullah in Lebanese daily al-Bina’

Secretary Kerry does not just want a temporary five-day truce in order to allow humanitarian aid – whether from the Houthis’ supporters or their enemies – to reach the Yemenis after their suffering has spread due to the suffocating naval, aerial and land siege imposed on Yemen by the Saudi-led Arab coalition. He wants a permanent ceasefire that totally ends this war after the aerial bombardment has begun to yield the exact contrary results. Most important is al-Qa’ida’s expansion and growing strength after its forces have taken control of the city of Mukalla, its port, and prison; the growing power of the Houthis whose forces have captured most of Aden; the ‘legitimate’ Yemeni President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s fall from power and the postponement of his return to Aden; and the gradual but rapid change among the Yemenis in opposition to the war and the emergence of a patriotic sentiment among them--pan-Arab www.railayoum.com

After a month-and-a-half of a scorched-earth policy in Yemen in general and Sa’da in particular, the human cost of this war is growing, as are the international community and humanitarian organizations’ pressures to declare a ceasefire and allow them to provide relief to those who need it in this already poor country. The infrastructure, which was weak before the war, has been subjected to methodical and systematic destruction, and its construction will require many long years and billions of dollars. As a result of this war, and as one of its consequences, al-Qa’ida has managed to expand and extend its influence. While, the Yemeni army was able to contain al-Qa’ida’s momentum and to deliver severe blows to it before the war, the organization’s hands and feet have now been unshackled. This is an especially worrisome situation for the U.S., which views al-Qa’ida’s Yemeni branch as the most dangerous of its offshoots for U.S. security-- ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

The truce announced in Yemen may provide Saudi Arabia with a way out from its predicament there, argues a Lebanese commentator in a pro-Damascus Beirut daily. Having given Riyadh sufficient time to prove itself in Yemen, Washington has finally decided to step in and phase down the war for fear of being impacted in a direct role there. The Houthi alliance with former Yemeni president Saleh realizes that the Saudi-led coalition faces a dilemma because it cannot achieve anything significant via its aerial bombardments and does not dare wage a ground invasion, notes the editorial in an online Arab daily. The alliance also recognizes that the truce proposed by the U.S. secretary of state for ‘humanitarian’ reasons represents an American attempt to extract the Saudis from their predicament. After a month-and-a-half since the start of the war in Yemen, it has become clear that it is a futile exercise, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. Even worse, it threatens to spill over into Saudi Arabia and is merely strengthening al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in the region.

EXPECTED FROM THE START: “The truce that was initially discussed during U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Riyadh [last week] after which the Saudi foreign minister announced a five-day extendable truce staring [tomorrow] May 12th only hours before the summit between the U.S. president and Gulf state leaders, was expected from the first moment Operation Decisive Storm began,” writes Hamidi al-‘Abdullah in Monday’s pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina’.

The fact that the U.S. president specified May 13th as the date for the summit with the Gulf states – that is to say, over a month after the start of this war – was intended to provide enough time for testing Saudi Arabia and its allies’ ability to achieve the aims they announced at the beginning of their assault. These were the destruction of the Ansarullah [Houthi] Movement, forcing them to hand over their weapons and withdraw from the cities and sites they had captured.

These were the declared aims at least. But there were also undeclared aims that provided the basis for launching a war on Yemen. Most important was to prevent the [Yemeni] army and the Ansarullah from advancing in the southern Yemeni provinces, especially Aden. This was meant to ensure that this city would be preserved as a stronghold for [fugitive] President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi whose term in office has already expired, and to protect him and consolidate his hold over the southern provinces even if this led Yemen’s partition; a de facto partition at least, as in the case of Cyprus.

But after 45 days of war, Saudi Arabia has proven to be unable to achieve any of its declared or hidden aims. All that has been achieved is killing large numbers of Yemenis, inflicting terrible damage on public installations, especially airports, factories and the roads linking provinces, and killing members of the army and the Ansarullah. But these losses have not prevented their alliance from advancing and capturing most of the southern provinces, including taking control of over 90% of Aden.

Today, and after so much time has passed, this war has not only failed to achieve any of its publicized and hidden aims; its repercussions now pose a serious threat to Saudi Arabia’s internal stability, and at the regional level. Over the past two weeks, fighting started on both sides of the borders between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. [Houthi-supported] Tribal forces have infiltrated Saudi Arabia and taken control of areas inside its borders.

Pursuing the conflict now poses the threat of a war of attrition that will affect Riyadh and its allies taking part in the war, just as much as it is hemorrhaging Yemen itself. Moreover, prolonging the war will not alter the balance of power that existed before Operation Decisive Storm; in fact, it has forcefully consolidated it and at a pace that is no different from what the Yemeni crisis was witnessing before the operation.

Because the U.S. is committed to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states’ security and because it has vast interests in this region, it does not want this war to continue for any longer. The fear is that it may spin out of control and confront the U.S. with difficult choices including the prospect of direct participation in the war, rather than merely supporting it and providing it with logistical backing and selling more weapons to the countries taking part in it.

“This is why the truce was timed to coincide with the Camp David summit; in fact, the repeated extension of this truce represents the best way out of this dilemma,” concludes ‘Abdullah.

End…

TWO REASONS: “When Operation Decisive Storm’s warplanes destroy Sayyid Hussein al-Houthi’s mausoleum, former president Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh’s family home, and a main mosque in the city of Sa’da, this is for two main reasons:” writes the editorial on the pan-Arab www.railayoum.com.

First, because the military target bank has run out after six weeks of war; and, second, in order to send a message of ‘intimidation’ to the Houthis and their ally president Saleh that the carpet-bombing that could totally destroy Sa’da and ‘Omran, will continue.

This is the bombing that precedes the ‘truce’ that emerged from the Paris meeting between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his Saudi counterpart ‘Adel al-Jubeir after the war in Yemen had entered a new and dangerous phase; that of ‘city wars’ in which the Houthis shelled the cities of Jizan and Najran in the Saudi south.

Most important is al-Qa’ida’s expansion and growing strength after its forces have taken control of the city of Mukalla, its port, and prison; the growing power of the Houthis whose forces have captured most of Aden; the ‘legitimate’ Yemeni President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s fall from power and the postponement of his return to Aden; and the gradual but rapid change among the Yemenis in opposition to the war and the emergence of a patriotic sentiment among them.

Two things that Kerry has said confirm the conclusion that he is seeking to end the war via a rolling extendable humanitarian truce:

- First, his statement that the truce will begin on Tuesday (tomorrow) provided that the Houthis agree to no shelling or shooting, no movement of forces, no maneuvers with the aim of redeploying their forces and no movement of heavy weapons. What may be gleaned from these terms is that the ball is now in the Houthi alliance’s court, which is supposed to be the ‘weaker party,’ such that the decision as to whether Secretary Kerry’s mission will be successful or not is up to it and not in the hands of Operation Decisive Storm and those waging it.

- Second, Secretary Kerry’s insistence that this truce is ‘renewable’ – that is, that the five-day period may be extended and subsequently turn into weeks or months, after which negotiations can begin; or rather, during which the climate may be prepared for such negotiations. And they will certainly not be held in Riyadh [as called for by Saudi Arabia] but in a ‘neutral’ capital.

This turnaround in the Yemeni scene stems primarily from a number of Katyusha rockets and mortar shells that were fired from the caves of Sa’da and ‘Omran at the two largest southern Saudi cities– Jizan and Najran – with the result that schools and airports were temporarily closed.

[Former] President Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh may have been closer to the truth, if only for the moment, in summarizing this scene and its future implications. Standing on the ruins of his destroyed home, he declared: ‘The balance of power in the region will radically change’ as a result of what he referred to as the ‘aggression’ on Yemen. And he urged the coalition forces to wage a ground invasion to ‘see how the Yemenis will receive them,’ in what was a clear and revealing challenge.

It is difficult to respond to Saleh’s invitation and wage a ground invasion; otherwise, the coalition would have done so since from the first week the war began. For what ‘rational’ actor would take this risk and cast themselves into the furnace of the fiercest fighters in the globe, regardless of which trench they may happen to belong to?

Former president Saleh’s provocative challenge is meant to say that he and his allies are unfazed by the aerial bombardment, not because he is unable to do anything in response, but because he realizes that he bombing will not last forever and must stop one day in the near future without achieving most of its aims as long as it is not coupled with action on the ground. The man knows Yemen well and spent thirty years of his rule in continuous wars, six of which were against the Houthis.

The Houthis have agreed to the truce after very carefully and calculatedly playing hard to get and dragging their feet. They certainly want this truce to catch their breath, at least, and because any extension would mean that the current status quo would remain as is.

“In other words, they will not withdraw from Sana’a or Aden or hand over their weapons; nor will President Hadi return to Yemen. What more could they possibly want?” asks the daily in conclusion.

End…

TOTALLY POINTLESS: “Why does the war on Yemen seem totally pointless?” asks ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in the Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

After a month-and-a-half of intensive shelling by air, land, and sea, no fundamental change has occurred in the battlefield. The advances by the Houthis and Saleh’s followers on the ground have not ceased, especially in Aden. The ‘Sunni’ coalition has not succeeded in securing a single Yemeni city to which President Hadi may return. The Houthis have not surrendered or laid down their arms; nor have they withdrawn from the city centers; while the armed forces loyal to Saleh have not witnessed any significant splits.

As a result of this war, and as one of its consequences, al-Qa’ida has managed to expand and extend its influence. While, the Yemeni army was able to contain al-Qa’ida’s momentum and to deliver severe blows to it before the war, the organization’s hands and feet have now been unshackled. This is an especially worrisome situation for the U.S., which views al-Qa’ida’s Yemeni branch as the most dangerous of its offshoots for U.S. security.

There are urgent questions posed by American and Western diplomats as to whether certain coalition members are wagering on using al-Qa’ida and its affiliated clans in combating the Houthis and whether they may have ‘facilitated’ the entry of ‘mujahidin’ to Yemen for this precise purpose. This is a worrisome development for Washington, which is expressing its growing interest in ending the war, even if on humanitarian grounds. But its concerns are really of a security and political nature, stemming from the fear that Yemen may turn into a major and safe haven for al-Qa’ida and the terrorists.

In recent days, the war has moved on to border areas. Southern Saudi villages, towns, and cities were bombarded by mortar shells and rockets. Daily life, including schools and airports, was disrupted; some inhabitants fled the area; attacks on Saudi troops and patrols increased and border clashes occurred whose results are not being revealed, according to many sources. And this means that if the crisis persists, Saudi Arabia itself will be a theater of operations and not only Yemen. This explains the intensity and force of the Saudi reaction to the border clashes and the violence of the Saudi bombing of Sa’da province.

Alarming and very worrisome assessments have reached decision-making centers in the Gulf capitals regarding the cost of the armament deals that the U.S., Britain, and France hope to conclude with the Gulf states, which, in light of the fall of oil prices, are capable of emptying their sovereign wealth funds set aside for future generations of all their content. They will also have the worst consequences for these states’ economic plans to confront the challenges of unemployment and development, compensate for the drop in oil returns, and appease and satisfy the needs of broad sectors of the public.

There is no political horizon for this war. This is what various Western diplomatic sources have been repeating. This is what they repeatedly say in closed meetings and in their media and research establishments.

For this reason, the focus now is primarily on the following:

- The need for an urgent ceasefire (if only on humanitarian grounds); providing Yemen – the whole of Yemen – with food, medical aid and other necessary aid; and emphasis on an international sponsorship for an inter-Yemeni dialogue, proposing neutral capitals for hosting it, despite the text of UNSCR 2216.

- The renewed priority for the fight against terrorism as the main and greatest regional challenge, and refraining from drowning the region in confessional wars and conflicts between axes from which only ISIS, the Nusra Front, and al-Qa’ida will benefit.

Western circles are worried at some coalition members’ ‘openness’ to groups and forces in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq that are classified as terrorist.

“And there is a growing fear that the anti-ISIS international coalition may collapse and that the war on terrorism will fail,” concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

2-Iran’s two bombs

The Camp David [Gulf] summit is asked to clarify the American attitude towards the two Iranian bombs: first, its nuclear program; and second, Iran’s regional role. The GCC refuses to view the agreement on the first bomb as a statement of good conduct that would provide Iran with the required resources it needs to protect and expand its second bomb. The issue goes beyond the proposed Gulf missile defense shield and the provision of a deterrent arsenal. It has to do with the U.S.’s view of its interests in the coming phase and the depth and seriousness of its commitments to its allies in containing the Iranian momentum in the region, and its commitment to provide irrevocable guarantees in this regard--Ghassan Charbel in pan-Arab al-Hayat

The Gulf/Iranian rift is greater than any rag can patch amidst Iran’s interventions in domestic affairs and against the background of spreading sectarianism’s poison in the Arab body and planting hostile cells inside and around the Gulf states. This renders it difficult to believe that Iran will opt for peace and stability, as Washington is claiming. Without written guarantees, it would be easy for the Americans to have a different understanding of what had been agreed orally. Therefore, it is only via such deeds that the U.S. can restore warmth to its relations with the Gulf states and prove that the nuclear deal, in its awaited final version, will not brook any ambiguous interpretations that could shroud its details--Salman ad-Dosari in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

The U.S. has been dealing with the regional problem as that of an Iranian nuclear bomb, maintains the Lebanese editor-in-chief of a Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily. But the Gulf states believe that there is a more important ‘bomb’ that the Americans are not addressing, namely, Iran’s role in the region. The success or failure of the Camp David Gulf summit will depend on how it addresses this second bomb. President Obama is trying to keep two balls in the air at the same time; special relations with the Arab Gulf states and with Iran, maintains the editor-in-chief of another Saudi daily. But this is impossible because of Iran’s hostile interventions in the Gulf states’ affairs. What is needed is written unequivocal guarantees from the U.S. to the Gulf states that are not open to interpretation.

NO TO THE POLICEMAN’S ROLE: “The U.S. does not want to play the role of Middle East policeman,” writes Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Monday’s Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

It does not want to spend billions of dollars and shed its own blood. But it certainly cannot turn its back on the fate of this part of the world. This is not only because of oil and Israel’s security, but because of the U.S. and the West’s security as well. Experience has shown that the Middle East’s ailments are contagious and that its deep-rooted terrorism threatens the safety of New York, Washington, Paris, Berlin, and elsewhere.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Camp David U.S./Gulf summit is an exceptional occasion that will leave its imprint on the Middle East’s fate for years or decades to come. What the summit needs to produce goes beyond distributing consolation prizes and guarantees. The situation is far too serious to be treated by painkillers and good wishes. What is needed, quite simply, is to determine the features of a new regional order that restores the required balance and provides safety valves that would end the series of collapses, coups, and breaches. It is clear that Iran’s shadow, bearing two bombs, will be present at the summit.

The summit will be held in the shadow of a number of extremely significant developments. The first is the drift towards concluding a nuclear agreement between the great powers and Iran before the end of June, and Barack Obama’s insistence on securing this agreement. The second development is the war that Yemen has been witnessing after the Houthi/Iranian adventure there. The third development is the war on ISIS and similar organizations, and its faltering pace due to the domestic confessional fragmentation in Iraq and Syria, and Iran’s clear involvement in these two countries’ wars.

The first message that the current war in Yemen has sent is that the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC’s) problem with Iran cannot be reduced to Tehran’s nuclear program. The GCC states believe that Iran’s role, which stems from the [1979] revolution’s burning coals rather than the Iranian state’s commitments, is the true bomb that threatens the Gulf’s security, the Arabs’ stability and their role in the region. As a result, the Gulf’s demand at the Camp David is that of adopting measures to restrain Iran’s regional role parallel to restraining its nuclear ambitions.

Camp David is being held at a time when the Middle East seems to be rushing towards an unprecedented abyss. Never have so many wars and collapses coincided as is happening today. Some are direct wars, and others are proxy wars. What is common between all that is happening is extreme fear; countries fearful for their borders or fearful of what is happening within them; the resounding collapse of international borders; the terrible destruction of coexistence.

Maps have been violated from outside, while states have been torn up from within. Major armies have fallen apart then sought refuge in confessional militias. National identity has melted and the identities of islands that hate each other has been awakened. New forces armed to the teeth have left their strongholds and adopted new suicidal practices or roles that are surrounded with risks on the arenas where they are acting. ISIS has turned into a regional power that violates whatever it wishes here or there. Hizbollah turned into a regional force that intervenes in nearby and faraway states.

The international management that can tame the region’s tigers or wolves went missing. Obama preferred to stick to the backseat. Vladimir Putin chose a policy of revenge along Syria’s peripheries, as a result of which winds have been blowing that resemble what was happening during the Cold War.

In light of all this, Saudi Arabia together with the GCC member states decided that ‘Iran’s role in the region is the more dangerous bomb.’ They have deemed Iran’s role to be responsible for dominating Baghdad’s ability to decide and dismantling Iraq’s basic structure. They have deemed it responsible for prolonging the war in Syria and transforming it into a confrontation that has turned the Sunni/Shiite divide into a line of fire. They have deemed it responsible for the emergence of ISIS and its spread across the Iraqi and Syrian maps. They have also deemed it responsible for the Lebanese state’s exhaustion and for keeping it headless [without an agreed president]. And when it became clear that this bomb/role had raised its head in Yemen, Saudi Arabia took the decision to break its encirclement and led a coalition to secure this aim. The decision was an expression of the Arabs’ rejection of maintaining their countries an arena for continuous Iranian coups while the U.S. was busy dealing with the nuclear file unilaterally.

For this reason, the Camp David summit is asked to clarify the American attitude towards the two Iranian bombs: first, its nuclear program; and second, Iran’s regional role. The GCC refuses to view the agreement on the first bomb as a statement of good conduct that would provide Iran with the required resources it needs to protect and expand its second bomb. The issue goes beyond the proposed Gulf missile defense shield and the provision of a deterrent arsenal. It has to do with the U.S.’s view of its interests in the coming phase and the depth and seriousness of its commitments to its allies in containing the Iranian momentum in the region, and its commitment to provide irrevocable guarantees in this regard.

It is not possible to build a viable regional order without restoring the balance. The Iranian role/bomb conflicts with this required balance. Any American hesitation in dealing with the role/bomb firmly and seriously, will detract from the summit’s significance and intensify the Gulf concerns about Obama’s ‘Iran policy.’ American hesitation will also lead to a flare-up in the regional confrontation, especially in the Syrian case, with the aim of breaking the lines of communication between the constituents of the role/bomb.

“The Camp David summit’s failure to act as a two-bombs’ summit will only pour petrol over the terrible Middle East’s fires,” concludes Charbel.

End…

THE MOST IMPORTANT MEETING: “The planed Camp David summit may be the most important Gulf/U.S. meeting in the past fifty years,” writes Editor-in-Chief Salman ad-Dosari in the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

This is not because this is the first time that an American president meets with the Arab Gulf leaders. It is because Washington realizes – and this is no secret – that the U.S./Gulf alliance is passing through a period of tension and a crisis of confidence. And – who knows? – the summit may offer a chance for placing the historical alliance’s train back on the track from which it has deviated in recent years.

The summit will be a chance for the U.S. administration to move away from merely stacking up words to the realm of action, a chance for it to dispel all doubts concerning its credibility in the region which is now being put to severe test beginning with the Syrian crisis, passing through its shaky attitude towards what is going on in Bahrain, Egypt, and Iraq, and ending with its awaited, ambiguous, and secret agreement with Iran.

A point in the U.S.’s favor is that it ruled by institutions and not the White House alone. It is not enough for the president to adopt certain positions – no matter what they may be. The Pentagon has its own positions, and there is also the intelligence community that cannot be excluded from the decision-making circles. Then there is Congress, the legislative body that can foil the president’s decisions in a constitutional manner.

There is no disputing the fact that all these institutions are aware of the negative consequences that U.S. interests may suffer if its alliance with the Gulf states were to be undone. Of course, it is certainly not necessary for both sides’ policies to be identical; but it is also illogical for U.S. policies to target Gulf interests, after which we would discover that American interests in the region are being harmed as well. That would indicate that Washington’s policies towards the region have taken a totally wrong turn.

A point in the Gulf states’ favor is that they have not reacted in an angry manner that would dismantle the link between their strategic interests and those of the U.S. For despite their anger at the surprising American positions in the region, these states – led by Saudi Arabia – have maintained their ties with the U.S., even when U.S. officials say one thing in the daytime and do the opposite at night. This is what happened in the case of Obama’s famous ‘red line’ that would be crossed if Bashar al-Assad’s regime were to use chemical weapons.

The Gulf Arabs have never had to deal with such conflicting American positions before. Yet they did not adopt a path of escalation with Uncle Sam. They never threatened – not in secret or in public – by reminding it that there are other superpowers that wish they could secure half the interests that the U.S. enjoys in the region.

We assume that President Obama will not meet with the Gulf leaders merely to reassure them verbally regarding the nuclear agreement with Iran. This has happened once, twice, and three times in the past. What is certain is that President Obama has a clear project that translates American words into deeds – as was revealed in a statement by an American official last Thursday which was published in Asharq al-Awsat regarding the ‘unprecedented’ military cooperation that is expected to be announced at the Camp David summit.

In addition, it is important for any American guarantees to be written, as Abu-Dhabi’s Ambassador to Washington Yousef Al Otaiba has said. The Gulf/Iranian rift is greater than any rag can patch amidst Iran’s interventions in domestic affairs and against the background of spreading sectarianism’s poison in the Arab body and planting hostile cells inside and around the Gulf states.

This renders it difficult to believe that Iran will opt for peace and stability, as Washington is claiming. Without written guarantees, it would be easy for the Americans to have a different understanding of what had been agreed orally. Therefore, it is only via such deeds that the U.S. can restore warmth to its relations with the Gulf states and prove that the nuclear deal, in its awaited final version, will not brook any ambiguous interpretations that could shroud its details.

The U.S. wants to hold two apples in one hand – special relations with the Gulf states and Iran simultaneously. This is an impossible balance to achieve, not because the Gulf states hate it, but because the Iranian regime is based on hostility towards its Arabian Gulf neighbor, and all its policies tend towards intervention in their affairs.

“This all there is to it, Your Excellency President Barack Obama,” concludes Dosari.

Ends…

This email is intended for the recipient only.

Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

The materials available through Mideast Mirror are the property of Alef Publishing Ltd or its licensors, are protected by copyright, trademark and other intellectual property laws.

Mideast Mirror - Alef Publishing Ltd.

Tel: 020 7052 96 00

Fax: 020 7052 96 09

Editorial and Enquiries:

Tel: ++ 44 773 4426 113

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Mirror Archive